Repositioning the Seal of Good Local Governance: Strengthening Local Performance Systems for a Meaningful Decentralization

Authors

  • Lesther D. Balmatero, EnP. The University of the Philippines Diliman, UP National College of Public Administration and Governance Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.64423/arpa.v34i1.70

Keywords:

Seal of Good Local Governance, decentralization, performance management, local governance, Philippines, public administration reform

Abstract

The Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG), institutionalized through Republic Act No. 11292  (2019),  is  the  Philippine  government’s  flagship,  performance-based  recognition and incentive program for local government units (LGUs). Designed to promote accountability, transparency, and holistic service delivery, the SGLG has provided a common governance roadmap but is now facing mounting challenges in the wake of the Mandanas–Garcia ruling and growing demands for decentralization. Drawing on qualitative policy analysis, this study combined document review, consultations with six LGUs, and dialogue with the DILG’s Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) team to examine systemic friction in the program. The findings highlight five  interrelated  issues:  (1)  an  overemphasis  on  documentation  and  input  indicators, (2) fragmentation across overlapping audit and performance systems, (3) divergent perspectives  on  output-  versus  outcome-based  indicators,  (4)  insufficient  institutional capacity, compounded by the decisive role of local chief executives in steering compliance, and (5) importance of leadership in SGLG compliance. The paper argues that SGLG risks devolving into a compliance exercise that rewards “good documenters” rather than genuine performers, while overburdening weaker municipalities. To reposition the SGLG as a developmental performance framework, four reform directions are proposed: (1) performance improvement support for LGUs that fall short but demonstrate progress, (2) transparency through an interactive SGLG performance dashboard, and (3) reducing duplication through data integration. The study further proposes a (4) tiered indicator framework—inputs (annual, all LGUs), outputs (three-year cycle, tied to recognition), and outcomes (selective, for exceptional LGUs)—to balance inclusivity, feasibility, and developmental ambition.Reforms along these lines would not only strengthen the SGLG but also advance the broader goals of decentralization by empowering LGUs, expanding citizen capabilities, and fostering a more accountable and responsive government.

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Published

2026-01-08

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Articles